This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent's problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. In particular, we provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game structure of the model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. Finally, we numerically analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents' strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model. In particular, we show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself.
Introduction
To account for development patterns that differ considerably among economies in the long run (Quah, 1996; Barro, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991) , a variety of one-sector optimal growth models that incorporate some degree of market imperfections have been presented. These are based on technological external effects and increasing returns (Dechert and Nishimura, 1983; Mitra and Ray, 1984) or the endogeneity of time preference (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Stern, 2006; Erol et al., 2011) . They have characterized the optimal paths and proven the emergence of threshold dynamics according to which the economies with low initial capital stocks or incomes converge to a steady state with low per capita income, while economies with high initial capital stocks converge to a steady state with high per capita income (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005 for a survey). However, to what extent these analyses are robust to the considerations of strategic interactions among agents in the economy still remains a concern. * Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 32486888553.
E-mail addresses: maria.camacho-perez@univ-paris1.fr (C. Camacho), csaglam@bilkent.edu.tr (C. Saglam), agah@bilkent.edu.tr (A. Turan). This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Each agent, receiving a share of income which is increasing in her own capital stock and decreasing in her rival's, invests over an infinite horizon to build her stocks. The heterogeneity among agents arises from differences in their initial endowment, their share of aggregate income, and therefore in their subjective discount rates. We adopt the non-cooperative openloop Nash equilibrium concept, in which players choose their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to commit themselves to time paths as equilibrium strategies. In this setup, agents choose their strategies simultaneously and each agent is faced with a single criterion optimization problem constrained by the strategies of the rival taken as given. We focus on the qualitative properties of the open-loop Nash equilibria and the dynamic implications of the strategic interaction.
In line with the empirical studies concluding that the rich are more patient than the poor (see Lawrence, 1991 , Samwick, 1998 and in parallel to the idea that the stock of wealth is a key to reaching better health services and better insurance markets, we consider that the discount factor is increasing in the stock of wealth. However, this implies that the objective function of each agent's single criterion optimization problem includes a multiplication of the discount function. This generally destroys the usual concavity argument which is used in the proof of the differentiability of value 0304-4068/$ -see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.05.002 function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979, Araujo, 1991) .
Due to this potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent's problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and the supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices (see Topkis, 1998) . The analyses on the properties of supermodular games have been extensively concentrated in static games and to some extent in dynamic games with stationary Markov strategies (see Cooper, 1999 , Amir, 2005 , Vives, 2005 for a general review). This may stem from the fact that the use of open-loop strategies has been noted for being static in nature, not allowing for genuine strategic interaction between players during the playing of the game. There are, however, many situations in which players lack any other information than their own actions and time so that the open-loop strategies can turn out to be unavoidable. The players may be unable to observe the state vector, let alone the actions of their rivals. In this respect, showing how the supermodular game structure can be utilized in the analysis of the dynamic games under open-loop strategies is inevitable.
In this paper, we first provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. In our dynamic game the open-loop strategies are vectors instead of simple scalars. Hence, the game requires an additional restriction to guarantee that all components of an agent's best response vector move together. This explains the role of the restriction that the payoff function of each agent has to be supermodular in his own strategy given the strategy of his rival. The supermodular game structure of our model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere. These allow us to derive conclusions on the nature of best responses, the set of equilibria and the long-run dynamics.
In particular, we analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents' strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model and try to answer the following questions: Can an agent with a larger initial stock credibly maintain this advantage to preempt the rival's investment and reach a better long-run stock of capital? Put differently, is the initial dominance reinforced by the actions of the agents? Can small initial differences be magnified and then propagated through time? Can this kind of initial advantages vanish in the non-cooperative equilibrium of this class of games with strategic complementarity? Can the agent with a low initial capital stock pull the rich to her lower steady state that she would never face while acting by herself? Under what conditions do we have a unique equilibrium with strategic complementarity under open-loop strategies?
The key feature of our analysis is that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric under open-loop strategies. We show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself. A remarkable feature of our analysis is that it does not rely on particular parameterization of the exogenous functions involved in the model, rather, it provides a more flexible framework in regard to the discounting of time, keeps the model analytically tractable and uses only general and plausible qualitative properties.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Tools needed while utilizing the supermodularity of the game, equilibrium dynamics and the steady state analysis have been discussed in Section 3.
Model
We consider an intertemporal one sector model of a private ownership economy à la Arrow-Debreu with a single good x t , and two infinitely lived agents, i = 1, 2. The single commodity is used as capital, along with labor, to produce output. Labor is presumed to be supplied in fixed amounts, and the capital and consumption are interpreted in per capita terms. The production function is given by f (x t ). We assume that each agent receives a share of income θ i (x 
where the functions u and β denote the instantaneous utility from consumption and the level of discount on future utility, respectively. In accordance with these, the problem of agent i can be formalized as follows:
subject to
given, where j ̸ = i ∈ {1, 2}, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. Agents may only differ in their initial endowment, their share of output, and therefore in their subjective discount rates.
We make the following assumptions regarding the properties of the discount, utility and production functions. Assumption 1. β : R + → R ++ is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and satisfies sup x>0 β (x) = β m < 1, sup x>0 β ′ (x) < +∞. Assumption 2. u : R + → R + is continuous, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies either u(0) = 0 or u(0) = −∞. Moreover, u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and u
Assumption 3. f : R + → R + is continuous, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies f (0) = 0. Moreover, f is strictly increasing and lim x→+∞ f
We say that a path for capital
As the utility and the discount functions are strictly increasing, we introduce a function U defined on the set of feasible sequences as
 .
The preliminary results are summarized in the following lemma which has a standard proof using the Tychonoff theorem (see Le Van and Dana, 2003; Stokey et al., 1989 
. Moreover, the set of feasible accumulation paths is compact in the product topology defined on the space of sequences x i and U is well defined and upper semicontinuous over this set.
In a recent paper, Erol et al. (2011) study the dynamic implications of the endogenous rate of time preference depending on the stock of capital in a single consumer one-sector optimal growth model. They prove that even under a convex technology there exists a critical value of initial stock, in the vicinity of which, small differences lead to permanent differences in the optimal path: economies with low initial capital stocks converge to a steady state with low per capita income. On the other hand, economies with high initial capital stocks converge to a steady state with high per capita income. Indeed, it is shown that the critical stock is not an unstable steady state so that if an economy starts at this stock, an indeterminacy will emerge.
In this paper, we propose a capital accumulation game where heterogeneous agents consume strategically. Heterogeneity arises from differences in their initial endowment, their share of aggregate income, and therefore in their subjective discount rates. Our interest focuses on the qualitative properties of the openloop Nash equilibria and the dynamic implications of the strategic interaction.
Non-cooperative difference game and open-loop Nash equilibrium
The non-cooperative game in consideration is a triplet
where N = {1, 2} is the set of players, S = Π i∈N S i is the set of joint admissible strategies under open-loop information structure and U i is the payoff function defined on S for each player
. Any admissible strategy for agent i is an infinite sequence compatible with the information structure of the game which is constant through time and restricted with the initial pair of capital stock in the economy. Accordingly, the set of admissible strategies for agent i can be written as
A few important remarks on the way the set of joint admissible strategies is constructed are in order. Denoting the set of joint feasible strategies by ∆, for any
. It is important to recall from Topkis
However, note that under the open-loop information structure of our game, the action spaces of the agents turn out to be dependent on each other converting the game into a ''generalized game'' in the sense of Debreu (1952) .
by the choices of agent j. This simply prohibits us to order elements in the joint feasible strategy space and calls for additional restrictions on the plan of the game in proving the existence of an equilibrium and analyzing the long-run dynamics via order theoretical reasoning. The admissibility condition 1 imposed on the set of feasible strategies of the agents allows us to write the set of joint admissible strategies as a simple cross product of each agent's set of admissible strategies that constitute a complete lattice. 2 We adopt the non-cooperative open-loop Nash equilibrium concept, in which players choose their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to commit themselves to time paths as equilibrium strategies. In this setup, agents choose their strategies simultaneously and each agent is faced with a single criterion optimization problem constrained by the strategies of the rival taken as given.
For each vector x j ∈ S j , the best response correspondence for agent i is the set of all strategies that are optimal for agent i given x j :
(1)
Given an equilibrium path, there is no feasible way for any agent to strictly improve its lifetime discounted utility as the strategies of the other agent remain unchanged. The set of all equilibrium paths for this non-cooperative game
is then identical to the set of pairs of sequences, (
We will concentrate on the existence of such an equilibrium. To do so, we will first prove that the best response correspondence of each agent is nonempty so that there exists an optimal solution to problem (P ). The dynamic properties of the best response correspondence then follows from the standard analysis in optimal growth models (see Stokey et al., 1989 , Le Dana, 2003, Erol et al., 2011) .
Dynamic properties of the best response correspondence
The existence of an optimal path associated with (P ) follows from the set of feasible accumulation paths being compact in the product topology defined on the space of sequences x i and U i being upper semicontinuous for this product topology. Let
We can prove that the associated optimal consumption and capital paths are positive at equilibrium.
given by
1 Whenever there exists a positive externality, i.e.,
≥ 0, ∀t, the admissibility imposed on the set of joint feasible strategies is far from a restriction.
Even in case of negative externality, i.e., 2 In order to be able to work on a joint strategy space which constitutes a complete lattice, one may also introduce an ad hoc rule that exhausts the available stock of capital at the period where the joint strategies of the agents turn out to be infeasible (see Sundaram, 1989 ). However, in such a case, showing that the payoff function of each agent exhibits ''increasing first differences'' on the joint strategies turns out to be unnecessarily complicated.
(
Proof. It can be easily checked from the first order conditions and the Inada condition.
In accordance with these, let the value function V associated with (P ) be defined by
The bounds on discounting together with the existence of a maximum sustainable capital stock guarantee a finite value function. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, one can immediately show that the value function is non-negative and strictly increasing. If u(0) = 0 then the continuity of the value function immediately follows as well. If u(0) = −∞ then the value function turns out to be continuous in the generalized sense so that it is continuous at any strictly positive point and it converges to −∞ when the stock of capital converges to zero (see Le Van and Dana, 2003) . Given these, the Bellman equation associated with (P ) follows. 
Proposition 2. (i) V satisfies the following Bellman equation:
Proof. See Le Van and Dana (2003) or Erol et al. (2011) .
The optimal policy correspondence associated with (P ), µ i : R + → R + is defined as follows:
It is important to note that although the utility function is strictly concave, the solution to (P ) may not be unique as the multiplication of a discount function destroys the concave structure needed for uniqueness. We can prove the following properties for the optimal policy correspondence associated with (P ). Van and Dana (2003 
Proof. (ii) Follows easily from (3). (iii) See Le
Recall that in a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and the usual concavity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal policy correspondence is single valued. Furthermore, the properties of the optimal path are easily found using the first order conditions together with the envelope theorem, differentiating the value function. However, in the i'th agent's problem (P ), although the utility function is strictly concave, the solution, namely Br i (x * j ), may not be unique as the objective function includes the multiplication of a discount function. This generally destroys the usual concavity argument in the proof of the differentiability of value function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979, Araujo, 1991) . To this end, we show that the value function associated with the i'th agent's problem (P ) is differentiable almost everywhere so that there exists a unique path from almost everywhere.
, there exists a unique optimal path from x i t for any t ≥ 1.
(ii) V is differentiable almost everywhere, i.e. the optimal path is unique for almost every x 0 > 0.
Proof. See Le Van and Dana (2003) .
We prove in the next proposition that the optimal paths associated with (P ) are monotonic. As a monotone real valued sequence will either diverge to infinity or converge to some real number, the monotonicity of the optimal capital sequences x i ∈ Br i (x * j ) will be crucial in the analysis of the dynamic properties and the long-run behavior of the best response correspondences.
Proposition 6. For any initial condition (x
Recall that there exists a unique equilibrium path from x i t for any t ≥ 1. Since
We will now present the condition under which the convergence to a steady state is guaranteed and concentrate on the behavior of the optimal paths x i ∈ Br i (x * j ) associated with (P ). Proof. See Erol et al. (2011) .
We will now concentrate on the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium to the non-cooperative game
. To achieve our goal, we will show that the non-cooperative game
is a supermodular game under openloop strategies. Besides, we will prove that under some regularity conditions, the set of equilibria is a nonempty complete lattice.
Supermodular games and the existence of Nash equilibrium
Let us first outline the fundamental properties of the supermodular games:
Definition 1 (Topkis, 1998 
These hypotheses on the payoff function for each agent i imply that any two components of agent i's strategy are complements and each component of i's strategy is complementary with any component of j ′ s strategy. The following theorem provides the existence of extremal equilibria in supermodular games with modest regularity conditions. Theorem 1 (Topkis, 1998) There are two fundamental elements in supermodular games: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity, which implies upward sloping best responses. These properties of supermodular games have been extensively used in static games and to some extent in dynamic games with Markov perfect strategies (see Cooper, 1999 , Amir, 2005 , Vives, 2005 for a general review). We already stated in the introduction that open-loop strategies do not allow for genuine interaction between the players during the game. However, they are most appropriate in situations where the information about the other players is reduced to their initial condition or games with a very large number of players. We can add games in which agents decide whether to enter or not a coalition. Suppose a number of players who evaluate the benefits of entering a coalition for a given period of time. They would set the rules of the coalition at the time the decision is taken. To evaluate the coalition, players would play open-loop strategies. For all these reasons, we believe it is important to show how the supermodular game structure can be utilized in the analysis of dynamic games under open-loop strategies.
Here we consider a dynamic game with open-loop strategies and place related restrictions on strategy spaces and payoff functions which lead to ordered strategy sets and monotone best responses: as the other player selects higher strategies, the remaining player will as well. This will allow us to derive conclusions on the nature of best responses and the set of equilibria. To this end, the next proposition is crucial as it establishes the conditions under which our capital accumulation game turns out to be supermodular. 
The set of equilibria for this supermodular game is a nonempty complete lattice and there exist a greatest and a least equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this dynamic game with open-loop information structure strategies are vectors instead of simple scalars. Hence, the game requires an additional restriction to guarantee that all components of an agent's best response vector move together. This explains the role of the restriction (8) that the payoff function of each agent has to be supermodular in his own strategy given the strategy of his rival. Put differently, given the choice of the rival, the agent is better off combining high activity in one component of choice with high activity in another (see Cooper, 1999) . The restriction (9) ensures that the gains to a higher strategy by one player increase with the strategy taken by the other so that the best responses turn out to be monotone. The key characteristic of a supermodular game, namely the presence of strategic complementarities is ensured by the restriction (9) which essentially implies the monotonicity property of the best responses.
Though the conditions (8) and (9) can be interpreted along general lines regarding the supermodularity of the non-cooperative dynamic games under open-loop information structure, a further refinement of the conditions will be useful in providing their limitations and economic interpretations to the full extent. Indeed, under Assumptions (1)-(3), the conditions (8) and (9) can be recast for each i, j ∈ N, i ̸ = j, and for all t as
respectively. Accordingly, the supermodularity of the non-cooperative game
crucially depends on the sensitivity of the agents' time preferences with respect to their stock of wealth and the sensitivity of the gains to a higher strategy by one player with respect to the rival's stock of capital. Note that for sufficiently low values of the marginal rate of patience, if the aggregate income of each player decreases with the rival's stock of capital, a sufficient condition for the supermodularity of the non-cooperative game turns out to be the supermodularity of the aggregate income of each agent, i.e. 
then the greatest and the least equilibrium of game Γ (τ ) are increasing in τ on T .
On a parameterized collection of supermodular games, the condition (10) ensures that the best response correspondence of the agents, hence the extremal equilibrium, will be increasing in a parameter that may be endogenous or exogenous due to the strategic complementarity inherent in the agents' strategies. As an example, consider that β(x) = η − γ e −(x+ρ) ε where 0 < γ e −ρ ε < η < 1, 0 < ε < 1, and ρ > 0 (see Stern, 2006 ). Proposition 9 asserts that an increase in η, a measure of patience, leads to an increase in the extremal open-loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular game
. That is, the more patient agents are, the larger the individual's capital stock at every period in the greatest and the least equilibrium trajectories.
In what follows we will concentrate on the dynamic properties of the open-loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular game
. Since the open-loop Nash equilibrium is weakly time consistent, instead of referring to the discrete time Hamiltonian, we will focus on the closed-loop representation of the equilibrium strategies and utilize (5), (6), and Proposition 7 in determining the dynamic properties of the equilibrium paths. 
Dynamic properties of open-loop Nash equilibrium and steady state
Let inf x>0 β(x) = β and 
However, it is important to note that the stationary sequences associated with each solution of (11) 
If the game was symmetric, we could have already concluded that the two agents will end up with the same amount of physical capital in the long run. Indeed, if a supermodular game is symmetric, then a greatest and a least equilibrium exist and they are symmetric. Amir et al. (2008) show that monotonicity induces the greatest and the least equilibrium converge to the highest and the lowest symmetric steady states, respectively. A game is symmetric supermodular if on top of the usual conditions for supermodularity, the agents' strategy spaces are identical and
Neither of these latter conditions are met in our game. Strategy spaces coincide only when the initial conditions are identical for both of the agents. Furthermore, the second condition also fails at the first period since we have u
Despite the lack of symmetry in the game, we prove that our game always leads to symmetric steady states so that the initial wealth differences vanish in the long run.
Proposition 10. All steady state open-loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular game
In the following proposition, we show that the individual level of capital stock at the lowest and the highest steady state open-loop Nash equilibrium is greater than the lowest and the highest steady states of the associated single agent optimal growth problem, respectively. Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that the stationary sequences associated with each solution of (11) may not constitute a steady state open-loop Nash equilibrium. This moves the concern on the number of solutions to the stationary Euler equations and among those that will be induced by a steady state open-loop Nash equilibrium. Since one cannot provide an analytical answer to this question, we will move on to the numerical analysis of our problem. The next section is devoted to this end. For given functional forms, we analyze the solutions to (11). In order to determine which of these indeed constitute a steady state open-loop Nash equilibrium, we employ the iterations of the Bellman operator (5) for the given stationary strategy of the rival. We compute the dynamics of the equilibrium paths from an initial condition, using the supermodular structure of the game on top of the iterations of the Bellman operator.
Characterization of the long-run equilibria: numerical analysis
The analysis of the solutions to the stationary Euler equations and the determination of solutions induced by a stationary openloop Nash equilibrium cannot be carried out without specifying the forms of the utility, discount and production functions. In what follows, our analysis will be based on the functional forms specified in accordance with Stern (2006) . The utility, production and discount functions are specified as
−(x+ρ) ε , where 0 < {A, ρ}, 0 < α, σ , ε < 1, and 0 < γ e −ρ ε < η <
1. Under these functional forms, in reference to Proposition 8, a sufficient condition for our strategic growth model to become a supermodular game is:
Condition (12) is trivially checked for σ ≥ 1 when ρ is sufficiently large, since
is a decreasing function and its supremum equals γ ερ −1+ε η−γ e −ρ ε . In accordance with these, we utilize the following set of fairly standard coefficients as our benchmark parameterization:
under which the maximum sustainable level of capital stock turns out to be A
, wherex is 213.747.
3
We prove in the first subsection of the following that strategic interaction removes indeterminacy, in case indeterminacy existed in the single agent optimal growth problem. Then, we continue our numerical analysis with the case in which multiplicity of equilibria persists in the long run.
Strategic interaction removes indeterminacy
Under our benchmark parameterization, we can prove numerically that strategic growth removes indeterminacy and implies global convergence towards a unique symmetric steady state. In order to provide a better exposition of this point, and to provide a basis of comparison for our strategic growth model, we first recall the analysis of Erol et al. (2011) and we concentrate on the dynamic implications of endogenous discounting in the single agent framework. , and x h = 8.4913. In order to determine which of these are actually the optimal steady states, we analyze the optimal policy using the Bellman operator. Fig. 1 indicates that x l and x h are stable optimal steady states, but in contrast with Stern (2006) , Fig. 1 strongly indicates that x m is not an optimal steady state. Indeed, if it were, the optimal policy would have crossed the y = x line at x m . The Bellman operator also reveals the existence of a genuine critical point at x c ≈ 5.5846: for any initial capital stock level lower than x c , the economy will face a development trap, enforcing convergence to a very low capital level x l . On the other hand, for any initial capital level higher than x c , the optimal path will converge to x h . However, if an economy starts at x c , an indeterminacy will emerge.
Case 2. Strategic growth.
Consider now the case where ( 
Multiplicity of equilibria
As we have already underlined, in a single agent optimal growth framework, the capital dependent time preference rate generates a critical point. In the vicinity of this critical point, small differences lead to permanent differences in the optimal path. Since this result heavily depends on the value of ρ, we would like to deviate from the benchmark to explore how strategic interaction modifies the single agent result. Hence, we assign a lower value to ρ, ρ = 4. The supermodular game
studied in this section exhibits multiple long-run equilibria although a single agent optimal growth model exhibits global convergence. Indeed, there exist three solutions to the stationary Euler equation (11) of the single agent optimal growth problem: x l = 0.3708, x m = 4.0061, and x h = 8.4315. Among these three solutions, x l turns out to be the only optimal steady state (see Fig. 2 As we show in Proposition 11, both of them are higher than the unique steady state of the single agent optimal growth problem.
We can easily show that threshold dynamics emerge. There exist critical values of initial capital (x c , x c ), below which an 
in x i , for any x j and U i has increasing differences in
The lattice S is a subset of R ∞ and it is a sublattice of it. (ii) Let us start proving that each individual payoff function is supermodular in its own strategy. By definition, a function f is supermodular if and only if
Consider two different strategies for agent i, x i and x ′ i who differ from each other at time t and t + 1 so that t+1 x = t+1 x
 .
We need to show that:
for all s, we have that the above inequality is equivalent to checking whether:
We shall proceed by dividing both sides by 
Note that when 
Put differently, in terms of period utilities,
together with
ensures the supermodularity of the game. Since S is compact under product topology and U i is upper semicontinuous in x i on S i  x j  , the result follows from Theorem 1.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 9
By the same reasoning that we use in the proof of Proposition 8-(iii), condition (10) assures that for each player, U τ i has increasing differences in (x i , τ ). All the rest follows from Topkis (1998, Theorem 4.2.2).
A.3. Proof of Proposition 10
We proceed in three steps. 
Proof. Let x * < x * , without loss of generality. Let x 0 be such that g
. Assume now on the contrary that x * <x * . We have, by construction,
where τ <τ . Consider the corresponding supermodular games Γ (τ ) and Γ (τ ). By Proposition 9, the greatest and the least equilibrium of the game are increasing in τ on T , i.e. steady state levels that the greatest and the least open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game converge to will be higher forτ . Since Γ (τ ) is a symmetric supermodular game, the least equilibrium converges to a symmetric steady state, i.e.x * ≤ x * , leading to a contradiction. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 11
Let x 0 be such that For the second case, let x 0 be such that
and consider the corresponding symmetric supermodular game. .
Note that if ∂ ∂x
holds where at least one of the inequalities will be strict.
